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alfred Schutz’s characterization of the interrelationship between relevances and 
typifications includes an analysis of the phenomenon of habit that, in his theory of 
knowledge, clarifies some essential aspects of common-sense interpretations in the reality 
of daily life. in form of “habitual possessions”, habit becomes in Schutz an element of 
knowledge, is characterized as a potential set of typical expectations to be actualized 
under typical circumstances. in this article, the constitution process of habitual 
possessions are analyzed considering its place in the interplay between relevance systems 
and typification structures in common-sense thinking – by pointing out that, for Schutz, 
habitual possessions must always be understood as habitual possessions of knowledge.
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in his theory of the social distribution of knowledge, alfred Schutz develops 
a concept of habit in order to clarify a specific aspect of the structuration 
of interpretative meaning in the reality of daily life. within the framework 
of the action theory – specially in the weberian tradition –, the term 
“habitual” is commonly used in contrast to the category of rationality. But, 
in Schutz, understood as “habitual possessions”, the phenomenon of habit 
becomes a central moment of the distribution of knowledge that functions 
as a binding notion between “familiarity”, “routine” and “interpretative 
meaning structures” or “systems of knowledge”. Schutz conceptualizes 
habit through an investigation of the interplay between emergence 
processes of systems of common-sense relevance and of structures of 
typification in the life-world. In the present study, the main interest is 
to show that habitual possessions must always be understood, from a 
Schutzian perspective, as habitual possessions of knowledge. In the first 
part, dedicated to a characterization of central functions of the habitual in 
Schutz’s phenomenology, the object of analysis is the way in which objects 
and behavior are typically interpreted. Then, the attention will turn to the 
results of processes of sedimentation, structuration and transmission of 
relevance systems involved in the social distribution of knowledge. after these 
two steps it will become clear in which sense, according to Schutz, habitual 
possessions make possible for interacting individuals to learn to recognize 
a specific typicality, as well as the sedimentation of familiarity and the 
structuration of relevance systems.
in his analysis of how knowledge and experiences are applied and 
sedimented in everyday life, one of Schutz’s interest is the constitution of 
general types characteristic of the common-sense thinking – in contrast 
to the “nonessential” types of the social sciences. Following edmund 
Husserl’s description of typification processes, Schutz considers the world 
of everyday life as constituted from the outset through typified experiences 
and expectations of the individual. According to Husserl, even in the first 
experience of a given object, we have a pre-knowledge of some of its aspects 
and a scope of anticipated possibilities that guide, at some level, the process 
of experiencing. in experience and Judgment husserl writes: “The factual 
world of experience is experienced as a typified world. (…) What is given 
in experience as a new individual is first known in terms of what has been 
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genuinely perceived; it calls to mind the like (the similar). But what is 
apprehended according to type also has a horizon of possible experience (…) 
and has, therefore, types of attributes not yet experienced but expected. (…) 
To begin with, what is experienced about a perceived object in the progress 
of experience is straightway assigned ‘apperceptively’ to every perceived 
object with similar components of genuine perception” (husserl 1976: 331). 
These anticipations are, in Schutz’s words, “typically determinate by their 
typical pre-familiarity, as typically belonging, that is, to the total horizon of 
the same and identifiable objectivity, the actually apperceived properties 
of which show the same general type. Thus, it is the horizontal anticipations 
which predelineate the typical preacquaintedness and familiarity of the 
objectivity given to our apperception” (Schutz 1970: 94). Thus, to understand 
how these typifications are constituted and how they function, implies 
an understanding of the constitution of the unquestioned. in his article 
“Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action“, published 
for the first time in 1953, Schutz speaks of how types must be formed in 
order to determinate what individuals consider natural, and indicates an 
important aspect of typification processes. As he points out: “in the natural 
attitude of daily life we are concerned merely with certain objects standing 
out over against the unquestioned field of pre-experienced other objects, 
and the result of the selecting activity of our mind is to determine which 
particular characteristics of such an object are individual and which typical 
ones (…). The construction consists, figuratively speaking, in the suppression 
of the primes as being irrelevant, and this, incidentally, is characteristic 
of typifications of all kinds” (Schutz 1962: 9; 21). Grasping the meaning of 
objects implicates, in other words, ignoring some particularizing traits, 
aspects or features of it that are not important for the specific context or 
purpose in which the object becomes thematic, in which is manipulated or 
arises for consciousness. Here lies the essence of typification: “Typifying 
consists in passing by what makes the individual unique and irreplaceable” 
(Schutz 1964: 234). In any typification process, qualities of the object are 
perceived in reference to a pre-conceived type of bundle aspects; a recollection 
of similar objectivities constitutes a ground of typicality for the experiencing 
as of an object of same type. now, this selectivity or suppression shows that 
perception implicates choice, but, in this process, at the level of passivity, 
presupposing, as described by Schutz in “Types and eidos in husserl’s late 
Philosophy” of 1959, an apperceptive “automatism” which seems, for us, 
to underlie every process of habitualization: “no apperception is merely 
instantaneous and transient; any apperception becomes a part of habitual 
knowledge as a permanent result” (Schutz 1970: 96). 
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indeed, as lester embree indicates, it is possible to identify different 
usages of the term “type” in Schutz’s phenomenology. in his theory of 
typification, Schutz speaks, following Max Weber, of “ideal types” as 
concepts or constructs of common-sense as well as of scientific thinking, 
since his interest, in many of his writings, is also of methodological 
nature. As Embree points out, Schutz uses “typification” and “typicality” 
in “broad significations that include both concepts of type, but with the 
former tending both as a noun and with reference to interpretation to 
express the narrower signification of ‘ideal type’ and the latter tending to 
express the narrower signification of Husserl’s ‘empirical type’” (Embree 
2012: 126). Yet, as mentioned previously, Schutz’s concept of typification 
structures has also an origin in edmund husserl’s theory of types, where 
the habitual can already be found as related to the notion of typicality. For 
instance, in husserl’s experience and Judgement, as shown above, typicality 
is described as genetically pre-constituted in past experiences, forming, 
following Schutz’s interpretation, habits or “latent habitual possessions, 
and are called forth or awakened by a passive synthesis of congruence if 
we apperceive actually a similar object. at the same time, by apperceptive 
transference a set of anticipations is created which attach themselves 
to the givenness of a newly encountered objectivity of the same type” 
(Schutz 1970: 110). in Krisis, Husserl, according to Schutz, modifies and 
complements some aspects of his theory of typicality and stresses the 
typical regularity in the changeability of qualities and of the position of 
objects in space and time, it is to say that under typical circumstances 
some objects behave similarly (husserl 1976: 22), or, as Schutz puts it, that 
they have habits: “The notion of typicality as used in the Krisis is the form 
in which the objects within our intuitive environment – the lebenswelt – 
together with their properties and their changes are given to our natural 
attitude. This form is that of a vacillating approximation. all regularities, 
even the causal ones, belong to the typical ‘habit’ in which things behave, 
as it were, under typical similar circumstances“ (Schutz 1970: 111). 
This problem of the different usages of the term “type” is also addressed 
by Ronald Cox, who suggests:  “The automatic intending of typifications 
in perceptual experience founds the grasping of eidetic concepts (…). it 
is, then, genuinely the founding level of the actional processes. The usage 
of the term ‘typification’ should accordingly be restricted to the level of 
automaticity” (Cox 1978: 172). In any case, we always find “typification” 
referred, at first, to everyday understandings and to the constitution of 
familiarities; in this sense, also related to the dimension of automaticity 
and, therefore, to habitualities in a broader sense, that is, as habits of the 
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object and as habitual possessions of individuals – as elements of the stock 
of knowledge at hand of the subject which constitute a potential set of 
typical expectations.
Schutz’s theory of typification can be considered an effort to describe the 
structure of mundane experience by pointing out, following husserl, that 
the phenomena constituting everyday life are given according to typicalities. 
As described above, we are given, in our everyday life, typified patterns 
of knowing and acting – our experience of objects in the world is defined 
through pre-acquaintedness. in other words: any object of interpretation 
is, from the outset, taken not only within a context of significance, but of 
a horizon of familiarity. States of affairs are grasped in reference to similar 
ones and to typical ways to deal with them. experiences constituting 
this context are, in this sense – considering the familiarity involved –, 
unquestioned taken. This does not mean that the concrete, experienced 
object cannot show individual characteristics, only that these qualities 
will also assume, for the interpretation, the form of typically apperceived 
individual aspects. even when objects are experienced as unique, this 
uniqueness is, thus, a typical character, the phenomena are of a determined 
kind, recognizable. 
in an analysis of Schutz’s application of eidetic methodology, michael 
Barber shows that Schutz’s critical attitude towards some aspects of the 
phenomenological reduction had consequences also for his theory of 
meaning formation in the everyday life: “Schutz’s study of the meaning-
structures of ordinary social life relies upon a form of eidetic analysis 
which aims at uncovering the invariant, unique, a priori meaning-
structures necessary to any concrete social world. Thus (…), Schutz engages 
in a constitutive phenomenology of the entire natural attitude itself 
(…).The invariant structures which Schutz unearths – the structure of 
consciousness, the corresponding forms of interpersonal understanding, 
and spatio-temporal stratification of relationships – these invariant 
structures emerge out of concrete social worlds and carry their sociality 
as one of their essential characteristics” (Barber 1987: 111; 117). according 
to his “antireductionist turn”, typifications, as instruments of the habitual, 
become a feature not only of our experience of things, but also of our 
experience of the social.
as mentioned previously, Schutz uses the weberian term “ideal type” to 
characterize instruments not only of scientific analysis, but, at first, of 
interpretations in real life. These typified schemes or models of experienced 
motivations and purposes make possible the apprehension of the meaning 
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someone else’s action. ideal types can, in this sense, be understood as 
instruments through which the world becomes intersubjectively real. They 
are “ideal” since are constituted through abstraction. This abstraction 
makes possible his use in different situations. This is the reason why, 
for Schutz, typifications and typification structures are responsible for 
the sedimentation of the social and social in nature – their social aspect is 
invariant and essential. Typification and its structures are always shared, 
always transmitted and reinforced within intersubjective processes. in 
his book on Schutz’s sociology of knowledge, Barber emphasizes that 
“there cannot be typifications that do not reflect the social milieu from 
which they originate and in which they are used. The social is not just 
accidentally affixed to necessary structures of typifications whenever they 
are concretely instantiated, but it is intrinsically necessary to every life-world 
typifications pattern” (Barber 1989: 79). That’s why, for Barber, Schutz’s account 
of the social distribution of knowledge results from his effort to combine a 
concept of sociality – considered as a strand sedimented in the typification 
structure of daily life – with husserl’s theory of the intentional structures of 
consciousness. 
in society, the distribution of knowledge refers not only to the differences 
between the content of what individuals know (considering their particular 
perspectives and biographical circumstances), but also to the different ways they 
know or have access to the same fact. with his contemporaries “consociates”, 
the individual shares not only knowledge, but, in Schutz’s terms, a community 
of space and time (of chronological and also of inner time) where the “vis-à-vis” 
relationship prevails. But the individual is never fully involved in this kind of 
interaction. in processes of everyday interpretation that concerns contemporary 
individuals, they also move away from the face-to-face interaction. Through a 
specific form of typification, the individual is able to grasp1 his fellow-men beyond 
the vis-à-vis interaction or we-relationship “by forming a construct of a typical 
way of behavior, a typical pattern of underlying motives, of typical attitudes of 
a personality type” (Schutz 1962: 17). From this perspective, types configure a 
turning point between the intersubjective validity of the social world and the 
subjective access to this reality, between intersubjectivity and perspectivity. 
Typicality carries out the intersubjective validity of meaning in the everyday 
world, it maintains everyday knowledge in its geltung. in daily life, individuals 
1  in the common-sense thinking related to the social, ways of grasping this meaning is through 
(subjective) personal types – ideal types of personalities – and (objective) course-of-action types – ideal 
types of behaviors and course-of-action types. while the course-of-action type is based upon experience 
of acts of the same type, a personal type, as Barber points out, refers to “a point of reference where all 
his personal characteristics as they existed when he departed intersect. in this case (…) naturally, such a 
type abstracts from the fullness of the individuality of the other” (Barber 1989: 47). in the interpretative 
context, the Other becomes an ideal object, an ideal construct through typification constellations. 
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expect that what is been once verified as valid, will remain valid, in an idealization2 
that constitutes an essential aspect of the phenomena of the habitual in the social sphere: 
the familiarity. in his book Reflections on the Problem of Relevances, Schutz writes: 
“familiarity itself, and even knowledge in general (considered as one’s habitual and 
dormant possession of previous experiences), presupposes the idealizations of the ‘and 
so forth and so on’ and the ‘i can do it again’. (…) familiarity thus indicates the likelihood of 
referring new experiences, in respect of their types, to the habitual stock of already acquired 
knowledge of a passive synthesis of recognition“ (Schutz 2011: 126). Familiarity has, 
therefore, a dual character. in an objective sense, familiarity means the aspect 
of the already experienced.  in a subjective sense, it refers to individual habits in 
recognizing and choosing actual experiences considering the types at hand in 
his stock of knowledge. moreover, Schutz shows that this habitual selection is also 
related to the interest and to the relevance implicated in the concrete situation. 
Schutz calls this situational background “system of relevances”; it is responsible 
to determinate the characteristics that are selected as typical and must, therefore, 
be considered in a necessary relation with typicality3. Thus, habits are not only 
results of sedimentations of social experiences, but also assume a constitutive 
function in their situational setting, supporting relevance structures. 
in Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, Schutz defines habitual possessions 
as follows: “it is the main characteristic of habitual possessions, that is 
of the knowledge we take for granted as beyond question (whether it be 
familiarity of thinking or of practice which is involved), that they carry 
along with themselves expectations (…) that the same or the typically 
2  The common-sense thinking exists despite the differences in the biographical situations and of 
“here-and-theres” between individuals in the social world. and this due to two kinds of idealization: 
the idealization of the interchangeability of the standpoints and of the congruency of the system of 
relevances. The presuppose in this idealizations – that actually configure a knowledge – is that the 
specificity of each biographical circumstances and of the different standpoints doesn’t interfere or 
are irrelevant for the interpretation. They constitute therefore what Schutz calls the general thesis of 
reciprocal perspectives and consist in typifying constructs “of objects of thought which supersede the 
thought objects of my and my fellow-man’s private experience” (Schutz 1962: 12).
3  For Schutz, relevances can be of three, interrelated types: topical, interpretational and motivational. 
Due to the topical relevance, things can, from the grounding field of familiarity, become problematic. The 
topical relevance is directly related to the object of attention. everything else “is in the margin, the horizon, 
and especially all the habitual possessions we have called the stock of knowledge at hand” (Schutz 2011: 
131). Interpretational relevance refers to the typifications that are decisive to the interpretation of an 
object or of a state of affairs. motivational relevances, in the form of in-order-to and because-motives, are, 
on the other hand, always referring to future action, constituting the interest, here understood as “the set 
of motivational relevances which guide the selective activity of my mind” (Schutz 2011: 129). relevances 
can, moreover, be intrinsic of imposed. referring to the topical relevances, Schutz characterizes this contrast 
as follows: “Whereas in the latter [imposed] system the articulation of the field into theme and horizon 
is imposed by the emergence of some unfamiliar experience, by a shift of the accent of reality from one 
province to another, and so on, it is characteristic of the system of intrinsic topical relevances that we may 
or may not direct our attention to the indications implicit in the paramount theme – indications which have 
the form of inner or outer horizontal structurizations or forms of topical relevances – that is, we may or may 
not transform these horizontal surroundings into thematic data” (Schutz 2011: 111).
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similar experiences will recur” (Schutz 2011: 132). in this sense, when an 
experience becomes part of our habitual possession, it becomes familiar. 
as soon as we acquire a habitual possession, we learn, in other words, to 
recognize a specific typicality. Moreover, we don’t know the exactly moment 
and why we possess a specific habit, in the sense that, in daily life, it doesn’t 
become topically relevant. For instance, considering fear as habitual 
possession, all we know is that it has its history and refers to a biographical 
situation. we learn typical ways to avoid what we fear and also to identify 
the characteristics of the object we fear, to identify its type: “The habitual 
possession of familiarity thus acquired is called our knowledge of this object 
of experience in respect of its type. The type is therefore the demarcation line 
between the explored and unexplored horizons of the topic at hand and the outcome 
of formerly valid systems of interpretational relevances“ (Schutz 2011: 129). 
in Schutz’s social theory of knowledge, these “systems of relevance” are 
only another term for frameworks of alternative actions. in dealing with 
a specific situational arrangement in the world, the consciousness will 
always seek for interpretative solutions in sedimented experiences that 
shows a thematic relation with or are relevant to the problem at hand, to the 
setting it is confronted with. as shown, it is the typicality involved in this 
process that makes possible, according to Schutz, the habit, the emergence of 
common-sense recipes for action, since there is an increment in knowledge 
– which must be understood not only as  knowledge of or about something, 
but also as knowledge of how to perform an action, to handle under typical 
circumstances – with every new experience. “To sum up”, writes Schutz, 
“we have found that what we call our stock of knowledge at hand is the 
sedimentation of various previous activities of our mind, and these are 
guided by systems of prevailing actually operative relevances of different 
kinds. These activities lead to the acquisition of habitual knowledge which is 
dormant, neutralized, but ready at any time to be reactivated“ (Schutz 2011: 
130). as ronald cox points out, systems of relevances are items of stocks 
of knowledge at hand “along with the sedimentations of previous mental 
activities, all being habitual possessions (…)”. hence, habitual possessions 
“also includes what Schutz has (…) called the ‘recipes’ of everyday action and 
knowledge in the world” (cox 1978: 91). 
For Schutz, our daily activities are performed through recipes reduced 
to “automatic habits”, through a knowledge referred to the regularity 
of events. in habits and in the routine in daily life,  recipes of action are 
followed in an application of typification constructs. Typification and 
system of relevances determinate, together, according to Schutz, the 
emergence of constructs in common-sense thinking. habits, on the other 
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hand, have their origin in the necessary typicality of daily life, they are 
only possible because the world cannot be experienced in totality, but through 
the selection of relevances, through typifications. Thus, by defining habit within 
the framework of a theory of distribution of knowledge, that is, as habitual 
possessions of knowledge, Schutz clarifies his concept of knowledge in an 
essential, constitutive feature. in his words: “it has to be kept in mind that 
our stock of knowledge at hand not only contains habitual possessions 
originating in our theoretical activities, but also it contains our habitual 
ways of practical thinking and acting (e.g., ways for solving practical 
problems), habitual ways and patterns of behaving, acting, working, and so 
on. The stock of knowledge at hand includes, therefore, the set of practical 
recipes for attaining typical ends by typical means (…)“ (Schutz 2011: 134). 
BETwEEN RElEvANCE SySTEMS AND TyPIfICATION STRUCTURES
TomaS da coSTa Bergische universität Wuppertal  
93
REFERENCES
Barber, m. (1987), “constitution and the Sedimentation of the Social in alfred 
Schutz’s Theory of Typification”, The modern Schoolman 64 (2), pp. 111-120;
Barber, m. (1989), Social Typifications and the Elusive Other: The Place of Sociology 
of Knowledge in alfred Schutz’s Phenomenology, lewisburg: Bucknell University 
Press and london and Toronto: associated University Presses;
cox, r. (1978), Schutz’s Theory of relevance: a Phenomenological Critique, The 
hague: martinus nijhoff;
embree, l. (2012), “Two concepts of Type in the work of alfred Schutz”, 
Schutzian research 4, pp. 125-131;
husserl, e. (1973), experience and Judgment, evanston: northwestern 
University Press;
husserl, e. (1976), die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaft und die transzendentale 
Phänomenologie, The hague: martinus nijhoff;
Schutz, A. (1962), “Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human 
action“, Collected Papers i: The Problem of Social reality, The hague: martinus 
nijhoff, pp. 3-47;
Schutz, a. (1964), “equality and the meaning Structure of the Social world”, 
Collected Papers ii: Studies in Social Theory, The hague: martinus nijhoff, pp. 
226-273;
Schutz, a. (1970), “Type and eidos in husserl’s late Philosophy”, Collected 
Papers iii: Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy, The hague: martinus nijhoff, 
pp. 92-115;
Schutz, A. (2011), “Reflections on the Problem of Relevance”, Collected Papers 
V:Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, The hague: martinus nijhoff, pp. 93-199.
BETwEEN RElEvANCE SySTEMS AND TyPIfICATION STRUCTURES
TomaS da coSTa Bergische universität Wuppertal  
